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Introduction 
“Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, 
we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of 
these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.” 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1878: 293) 
 
 
With these words, Peirce heralded a sea change in the philosophy of human thought 
and reasoning that not only dominated American philosophy for the ensuing half 
century or so, but also had profound influence in the practical domains of law, 
education, politics, religion, social theory, and the arts. This statement, which has 
come to be seen as the originating maxim of Pragmatism, suggests that the meaning 
of ideas resides in the actions that they lead to rather than in their antecedent causes. 
This principle was subsequently picked up and further developed by William James, 
who proposed “The ultimate test for us of what a truth means is indeed the conduct it 
dictates or inspires” (James, 1898: 259). Similarly,  John Dewey, whose central 
interest was the nature of knowledge and knowing, emphasized the consequential 
character of knowledge as “an instrument or organ of successful action” (Dewey, 
1908 [1977]: 180), while George Herbert Mead’s focus on the social dynamics of 
meaning-making lead him to suggest that if “the gesture of a given human organism 
… indicate[s] to another organism the subsequent (or resultant) behavior of the given 
organism, then it has meaning” (Mead, 1934: 76). In all of these, the explicit link 
between knowledge (or meaning) and action suggests that ideas are more than mere 
accretions of past experience, but rather, their importance lies in their projected 
influence on future experiences. 
 
Peirce, James, Dewey and Mead are widely regarded as the originators of classical 
Pragmatism. They were all committed to finding practical ways of accounting for 
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human conduct and meaning-making in all of its dynamic and social complexity. 
They sought practical solutions to the myriad practical problems that arise in lived 
human experience. By linking knowledge and action, they departed dramatically from 
the prevailing rationalism of their philosophical times, which they saw as too abstract 
and too academic to be of practical value. Not surprisingly then, their ideas were 
greeted with howls of derision from the more rationalist members of the philosophical 
community. Famously, G.K. Chesterton (1908: 62) wrote “Pragmatism is a matter of 
human needs … and one of the first of human needs is to be something more than a 
pragmatist”, while Bertrand Russell (1961: 782) issued the following warning against 
Pragmatism: 
 
“… I feel a great danger, the danger of what might be called cosmic 
impiety. The concept of 'truth' as something dependent upon facts largely 
outside human control has been one of the ways in which philosophy 
hitherto has inculcated the necessary element of humility. When this 
check upon pride is removed, a further step is taken on the road towards a 
certain kind of madness … this intoxication is the greatest danger of our 
time, and … any philosophy which, however unintentionally, contributes 
to it is increasing the danger of vast social disaster.” 
 
 
For the Pragmatists, however, these criticisms simply served to confirm their assertion 
that what people believe to be true is what they find to be useful. James observed: 
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“When the pragmatist undertakes to show in detail just why we must defer 
[to experience], the rationalist is unable to recognize the concretes from 
which his own abstraction is taken. He accuses us of denying truth; 
whereas we have only sought to trace exactly why people follow it and 
always ought to follow it. Your typical ultra-abstractionist fairly shudders 
at concreteness: other things equal, he positively prefers the pale and 
spectral. If the two universes were offered, he would always choose the 
skinny outline rather than the rich thicket of reality. It is so much purer, 
clearer, nobler.” (James, 1907: 68) 
 
As with any frame breaking shift in thinking, Pragmatism has been exposed to endless 
re-interpretation, its ‘new wine’ often becoming tainted by the ‘old bottles’ of more 
established paradigmatic perspectives. Many commentators have suggested that 
Pragmatism’s day in the sun has long gone (e.g. Thayer, 1982), dismissing it as 
philosophically passé and politically naïve. Others have associated it negatively with 
the excessively liberal optimism and economic progressiveness of American big 
business, while a persistent critique has been that Pragmatism lacks sufficient 
coherence to be deemed a distinctive doctrine or ‘school of thought’. Indeed, Lovejoy 
distinguished thirteen logically independent meanings of Pragmatism from his reading 
of Peirce, James and Dewey, concluding that “the pragmatist is not merely three but 
many gentlemen at once” (Lovejoy, 1963: 1). This confusion was further exacerbated 
by the originators themselves, who never could quite agree on what to call their way 
of thinking – after James (1898) coined the term ‘pragmatism’, Peirce set about 
distinguishing his ideas from James’ by calling his own approach ‘pragmaticism’, 
which he suggested would be a name “ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers” 
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(Peirce, 1905: 105). Meanwhile Dewey preferred the terms ‘experimentalism’ or 
‘instrumentalism’ to capture his notion of ideas as playful instruments for 
experimental action (Dewey, 1925 [1984]), while Mead adopted ‘social behaviorism’ 
to label his perspective on Pragmatism. In Lovejoy’s view, this lack of a clear and 
stable definition, let alone a single unifying label, was a fatal flaw that doomed 
Pragmatism to philosophical insignificance.  
 
It has to be said, however, that the originators of Pragmatism never set out to establish 
a doctrine or a school of thought. Rather, they saw their ideas as a movement or a turn 
in philosophy that offers a method of inquiry as an empirically grounded way for 
accessing fresh insights. This movement continues today, as evidenced by a steady 
stream of new collections and anthologies that have continued to develop Pragmatist 
ideas through constructive debate and application to real problems (see for instance 
Haack & Lane, 2006, and the international journal 'Contemporary Pragmatism'). This 
ongoing inquiry is what makes Pragmatism a living, evolving philosophy that is still 
very much a work in progress. In this sense, it is no different from other relatively 
recent developments in philosophy, such as phenomenology or analytical philosophy, 
which are equally difficult to pin down to a clear and unambiguous doctrine. We 
suggest, therefore, that there is still much to be gained by revisiting the works of the 
classical Pragmatists and their legacy. This is particularly so in the field of 
organization studies, which is in the throes of seeking new and creative engagement 
with the ways that people conduct themselves in organizations and account for their 
lived experiences of organizational life.  
 
 5
What we aim to do in this chapter is to elucidate those aspects of Pragmatist thinking 
that are particularly relevant to the field of organization studies. In undertaking this 
task, we must declare that our specific knowledge of Pragmatism is informed 
primarily by the works of Dewey and Mead. Although we will, of necessity, write 
from this position, we do not wish to imply any ranking or prioritization of these 
writers above the others. They are, in our view, all productively mutually informing, 
and in many ways it makes little sense to make hard distinctions between their ideas. 
We also acknowledge that our research interests revolve specifically around issues of 
organizational learning and creativity, which we will draw upon to illustrate our 
arguments.  We will further argue that Pragmatism has great potential to inform 
organization studies more generally, especially in the theorizing of organizational 
practices. 
 
In the next section we begin by laying down an understanding of the context and 
influences that contributed to the original development of Pragmatism. Then we move 
on to elaborate four key themes that, we suggest, can usefully inform understandings 
of the lived and living aspects of organizations and their members. The practical 
utility of these themes is then discussed in relation to organizational learning theory, 
where we consider not only learning as socialization, but also learning as creative 
practice. The chapter then moves on to explore the extent to which the influence of 
Pragmatism can be seen in contemporary organization theory. In particular, we focus 
on the groundbreaking work of Karl Weick and suggest ways in which his theories of 
organizing and sensemaking might be further elaborated using Pragmatist thinking. 
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The Classical Pragmatists in Context 
Pragmatism, of course, did not simply spring out of nowhere. The seeds of its 
emergence can be traced to Anglo-European traditions of philosophy and literature 
stretching from Heraclitus and Aristotle to Descartes, Kant and Hegel. The original 
Pragmatists were also deeply influenced by the scientific developments of their time, 
including Darwinian evolution and Einsteinian relativity. The intellectual soil that 
then nurtured these seeds, and which also gave rise to such literary giants as Ralph 
Waldo Emerson and Thomas Jefferson, was distinctively American in its theological 
practicality and democratic common sense. America looked forward to a new world 
of possibilities and backwards at the class-divided social structures of Europe, which 
privileged traditions and family ties ahead of actions and abilities. The country’s 
boundaries towards the West were open and fascinating, while at the same time, 
industrialization and mass production were transforming society. Philosophically, this 
period was characterized by a multiplicity of contradictions that set science against 
religion, positivism against romanticism, intuition against empiricism, and the 
democratic ideals of Enlightenment against the traditions of aristocracy. In this 
context, Pragmatism served as a consensual method of doing philosophy that sought 
to transcend these many dualisms (Scheffler, 1974).  
 
The common ground occupied by the original Pragmatists was sceptical of absolutes 
and wholes, and of certainties and finalities. They challenged universalist and 
foundationalist assumptions, suggesting pluralism and evolutionary emergence as 
more fruitful explanations of our contingent and changeful world. For them, “pure 
experience” (James, 1912 [2006]: 19) was the source of practical, actionable 
knowledge. It is through our experimental and reflexive engagement with each other 
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and the natural and social worlds of which we are a part that over time we affirm 
habits and uncover new insights to inform our ongoing conduct. By these means, we 
continuously construct and re-construct meanings of both our worlds and our selves. 
These characteristic themes frame Pragmatism as a distinctive system of philosophy, 
which we denote throughout this chapter with a capital ‘P’, to distinguish it from 
more common parlance in which pragmatism is simply an everyday matter of getting 
the job done. A pragmatist in this latter sense is someone who is less concerned with 
meanings and explanations than with results (at whatever cost). 
 
This common ground aside, there were significant and persistent differences between 
Peirce, James, Dewey and Mead. Each made a unique contribution to the emerging 
philosophy of Pragmatism, leading to a contest of ideas that is still very much alive in 
the contemporary literature. Let us now briefly examine the distinctiveness of each of 
these four originators of Pragmatist thinking.  
 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) was educated as a chemist and worked for much 
of his life as a scientist, but it is for his extraordinarily innovative contributions to 
philosophy and logic that he is best remembered. His intellectual reach encompassed 
philosophical issues as diverse as scientific metaphysics, theology, cosmology, and 
aesthetics, and he is recognized as the founder of modern semiotics, in which the 
interpretation of signs provides the medium for meaning-making. Although the 
breadth of his thinking extends beyond Pragmatism, Talisse (2007) argues that 
Pragmatism nevertheless lay at the heart of his philosophy. Unlike James, Dewey and 
Mead, however, Peirce never conceived Pragmatism as a philosophy in its own right. 
Rather he saw it simply as a method to clarify thinking by clearing away obstacles 
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and diversions along the pathway of meaningful inquiry. As is evident in the 
Pragmatist maxim with which we opened this paper, Peirce’s method explicitly 
connects meaning to the conceivably practical consequences of our actions. It is by 
reflecting on these consequences that we clarify our meanings. For Peirce then, clear 
reasoning is a continuously evolving process that is inherently creative and aesthetic 
(Anderson, 1987). He developed the idea of abduction as a way of distinguishing this 
spontaneous, creative action from deductive and inductive forms of reasoning. 
Whereas deduction probes the boundaries of thought within a closed system, and 
induction structures evidence to support the formation of opinions, the abductive 
process involves the imaginative creation of explanatory hypotheses, generating 
alternative ‘may-bes’ in response to ‘what if’ inquiries. Ultimately, he argued that all 
scientific reasoning is dependent upon abductive processing as this is the only 
possible source of novel ideas (Anderson, 1987). In sum, Peirce’s focus on the 
consequences of action, the abductive generation of alternative futures, and the 
semiotics of meaning-making processes are his abiding contributions to Pragmatist 
thinking. 
  
William James (1842-1910) also began his career as a natural scientist, receiving his 
PhD in medicine in 1869. His dual interests in psychology and philosophy lead to him 
holding university chairs at Harvard in both disciplines at different times in his career. 
His intellectual contributions include ‘Principles of psychology’, which is still 
regularly cited today, and his ‘Essays on radical empiricism’, which set out a 
comprehensive critique of the rationalism that dominated philosophical thinking at the 
turn of the twentieth century. Throughout his work, however, the threads of 
Pragmatist thinking are always evident. He is often credited as the founder of 
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Pragmatism, having introduced this term in a lecture he delivered in 1898.  Although 
he openly acknowledged Peirce’s work of twenty years earlier as the source and 
inspiration for his ideas, it was James rather than Peirce who captivated philosophical 
imaginations. He extended Peirce’s Pragmatist maxim beyond a method of doing 
philosophy, to become a complete, systematic philosophy that incorporates its own 
metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Within this, the connection between ideas and 
actions as co-constituting aspects of human conduct represents a radical departure 
from the prevailing idealist, rationalist, and empiricist trends in philosophy. James 
argued that the process of apprehending alternative futures to inform actions in the 
present necessarily engages the human mind, both cognitively and emotionally 
(Barbalet, 2004). In effect, James psychologized Peirce’s original conception of 
Pragmatism, shifting away from the notion that the meaning of a proposition lies 
purely in its practical consequences, to the view that meanings are a matter of 
believing them to be true (Talisse, 2007). Peirce was vehemently opposed to this 
revision of the Pragmatist maxim, arguing that it is empirical experience, not belief, 
that clarifies meanings (Peirce, 1905). 
 
The third of the original Pragmatists was John Dewey (1859-1952), who was strongly 
influenced by Hegelian thinking in his training as a philosopher. His ideas have been 
influential in many fields, not least education, where he pursued questions relating to 
the nature of learning and knowledge, and ethical judgment in the formation of moral 
ideals. Like Peirce, he saw Pragmatism as a method of doing philosophy rather than a 
solution to philosophical dilemmas. And like James, he also extended Peirce’s 
Pragmatism, but in quite a different direction. Specifically, Dewey took the 
embryonic model of inquiry proposed by Peirce (1877) and developed this into a 
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comprehensive theory that frames inquiry as a continuously unfolding social process 
in which meanings are constructed as people engage with each other (Dewey, 1933 
[1986], 1938 [1986]). He made much of the continuity of lived experience that links 
the past and the future through the actions of the present. Reminiscent of Peirce’s 
notion of abduction, Dewey argued that critical thinking, or inquiry, is a method of 
generating working hypotheses or ‘warranted assertabilities’, the consequences of 
which may be tested through either imagination or concrete action. Whereas Peirce 
saw an individual’s doubt as the starting point for critical thinking, Dewey insisted 
that it is doubt in the situation that initiates inquiry (Talisse, 2007). In Dewey’s hands 
then, Pragmatism became a method to think and act in a creative and insightful 
manner in social situations. 
 
George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) was a close colleague and lifelong friend of John 
Dewey, and also another foundational contributor to the Pragmatist project. He was a 
social psychologist whose efforts were directed towards developing a philosophically 
grounded theory of sociality that incorporated the key concepts of process, 
emergence, and evolution (Mead, 1934). Although his intellectual contributions are 
often conflated with those of Dewey, his unique legacy lies in the elaboration of 
Peirce’s ideas about the nature of mind, language and signification in understanding 
the construction of meanings. He argued that people simultaneously construct both 
their sense of self and their sense of situation in ongoing, symbolically mediated 
processes of social engagement. He described these processes as cycles of gestures 
and responses by means of which we come to understand each other’s conduct, and to 
better anticipate how others might respond to our own actions (Mead, 1913, 1925). 
The self that engages in these gestural conversations is ineluctably social and 
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comprised of two inter-related aspects: the objective ‘me’ is the embodied behavioral 
norms and values of the social groups to which a person claims membership, and the 
subjective ‘I’ is a person’s spontaneous, performative response to the social 
conventions and habits represented by the ‘me’. The ‘me’ permits a reflexive attitude 
towards the self, while the ‘I’ is the principle of action and impulse that introduces 
uncertainty and the potential for novelty into the processes of the self. It is in the 
continuous interplay between these two aspects of the social self that meanings are 
reinforced and constructed afresh. These dimensions complement and add empirical 
descriptiveness to Dewey’s notion of critical thinking. 
 
From the foundations laid down by these four originators, the Pragmatist project has 
continued to grow and evolve through the works of other early contributors such as 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jane Addams, Clarence Irving Lewis, Charles Horton 
Cooley, and Mary Parker Follett. More recently, widespread interest was re-ignited by 
the publication of Richard Rorty’s (1980) ‘Philosophy and the mirror of nature’. What 
came to be seen as a neo-Pragmatist revival has been much criticized by followers of 
the classical Pragmatists as “an idiosyncratic, unorthodox, and, in many estimations, 
perverse vision of what [P]ragmatism is” (Talisse, 2007: 3). Essentially Rorty 
abandoned experience, which the original Pragmatists had held to be the very stuff of 
philosophical theorizing, in favour of language and the linguistic turn, especially as it 
appears in the French literary tradition of Jacques Derrida. Talisse (2007) argued that 
Rorty’s provocation has created a veritable industry in philosophy to criticize and 
correct his ‘misguided’ conception of Pragmatism. Principal amongst Rorty’s critics, 
Hilary Putnam accused him of a cultural relativism that rejects the notion of truth, 
seeing it as mere self-deception. By contrast Putnam, who is more informed by the 
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analytical philosophy of science and technology than by literary criticism, emphasized 
a commitment to warrantable, justifiable forms of knowledge that emerge through the 
process of inquiry, which is so central to the Pragmatist agenda. 
 
This debate between Rorty and Putnam has served to reinstate Dewey as a legitimate 
contributor to contemporary philosophical discussion, while also reviving interest in 
Pragmatism more generally. Increasingly, contemporary philosophers are engaging 
with the important task of lifting Pragmatism beyond its very American roots by 
reinterpreting it in the context of more recent developments in European philosophy. 
So, for instance in America, Richard Bernstein has extensively reworked Dewey’s 
ideas on practice, ethics and political theory, Mitchell Aboulafia has brought the 
thinking of Bourdieu and Habermas to bear on Mead, and Richard Posner has built on 
Oliver Wendell Holmes’ Pragmatist-inspired writings on jurisprudence, while in 
Europe Hans Joas has deepened understandings of Mead’s notion of creative action. 
All in all then, it seems that Pragmatism may still have much to offer in today’s 
world.  
 
Four key themes in Pragmatism 
In this section we introduce four key themes in Pragmatism, ‘experience’, ‘inquiry’, 
‘habit’ and ‘transaction’, all of which have to do with what it means to be human, and 
how selves and social situations can be seen as mutually informing and co-
constructing dynamics. As such, these themes transcend the conventional separation 
between individual and organizational levels of analysis. They are deeply interwoven 
and difficult to tease apart, but we must do so here in order to present them in a 
readable way. Our ultimate intention though, is to consciously and deliberately bring 
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them together as an integrated whole that offers a complete theoretical description of 
social practices in organizations. 
 
We begin with the notion of experience as both active and passive rather than as a 
mere accumulation of past actions. Then we move to consider inquiry, in which 
experimental thinking and action develop ideas and concepts that re-constitute the 
present situation. Next we turn to habits, which are defined in Pragmatism as 
dispositions towards specific actions.  And finally, we discuss the notion of 
transaction, which is concerned with the social actions that constitute experience and 
habit and out of which inquiry is derived.  
 
Experience 
Experience is a consistent theme amongst all of the classical Pragmatists. James (1912 
[2006]), for instance, rejected the notion of ‘consciousness’ as too diaphanous to have 
any meaningful function in the development of philosophical first principles. Rather, 
he argued for a radical empiricism based on the temporal processes of ‘pure 
experience’ in which the experiential tissue of life is continuous in time. Similarly, 
Dewey had already laid down the ideas for his later, more mature notion of 
experience in his 1896 paper, in which he critiqued the way the reflex arc concept in 
psychology deals with the relationship between knowledge and action (Bernstein, 
1966 [1967]; Dewey, 1896 [1972]). He rejected the possibility of understanding 
human conduct as a mechanistic sequence of sensation, idea and response, which 
contrives to separate thinking from doing rather than taking both as “functional 
elements in a division of labor which together constitutes a whole” (Dewey, 1896 
[1972]: 100). He preferred to talk about “organic behavior” as a basic unit of conduct 
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in which knowledge and action are inseparable processes. Dewey further argued that 
Darwin’s theory of evolution demanded a complete reconceptualization of experience, 
not as a mere accretion of past impressions, but as “the intercourse of a living being 
with its physical and social environment” (Dewey, 1917: 6). He saw experience as the 
experimental activities of organisms as they adapt to, and within, their environments. 
That is, experience comprises both the passive effects of situations upon selves, and 
the active influences of selves on situations. 
 
Dewey elaborated his distinctive notion of experience as follows (Dewey, 1925 
[1981]). Firstly, experience is more than just knowledge, and indeed, if experience is 
defined in purely epistemological terms, then there is a risk of losing sight of the 
transactional and social dimensions of experience as everyday living. Secondly, he 
strongly refuted the notion that experience is a purely subjective and private affair, 
which was a prevalent attitude in philosophical circles after Descartes. Dewey argued 
that all experience has an objective dimension but that ‘sharing experiences’ must be 
more than a metaphor because shared objective situations are always interlaced with 
subjective experiences. Thirdly, experience serves a projective and anticipatory 
function in linking present actions to future expectations; in other words we live life 
forwards by projecting our past experiences into our anticipations of the future. It is 
this connection to the future that underlies all intelligent activity. Fourthly, 
emphasizing the temporality and continuity of experience, Dewey claimed that it 
evolves through a continuous series of situations. And finally, although experience is 
not primarily an epistemological term, it is not possible to think of experience without 
reasoning, because ideas and concepts will always be part of experience.  
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Mead’s contribution to this theme was firstly to elaborate Dewey’s second point of 
definition above by arguing that experience is necessarily social. From Mead’s 
perspective, experience can only be understood in terms of sociality: 
 
“Meaning … arises in experience through the individual stimulating 
himself to take the attitude of the other in his reaction[s]” (Mead, 1934: 
89) 
 
That is, we gain insight into situations by attempting to see them through the eyes of 
others. In the absence of such common, or shared, experiences of social situations, 
social order cannot develop. Like Dewey, Mead emphasized the combination of, and 
interplays between, both passive and active aspects of experience. Further, he argued 
that because selves are socially constructed, it is not possible to objectively 
experience the self without social engagements that offer a mirror to reflect the 
objective self. Experience then, is the process of constructing and re-constructing 
meanings of both selves and situations. Recognizing the importance of these social 
dimensions, Dewey later regretted the many misunderstandings that his description of 
experience had engendered. In 1951 he wrote to Arthur Bentley (with whom he 
authored the book “Knowing and the Known” (1949 [1991])) that he would have used 
the term “culture” had he been able to rewrite his book “Experience and Nature” 
(Boydston, 1981 [1925]). Consequently, when we use the notion of experience here, 
we intend it in this broader sense as clearly social, cultural and historical.  
 
Mead’s second contribution to this theme was to recognize experience as a temporal 
flux that is located in the living present, and is informed by both the interpreted past 
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and the projected future. It is in the now that lives are lived and meanings are enacted 
by drawing on the past to anticipate future consequences. The inherently temporal and 
narrative qualities of social participation cannot be adequately addressed by theories 
that see time as a mere succession of discrete moments, or what Bergson (1919) 
referred to as spatialized time.  The “veritable mountain of fragments and writings” 
(Joas, 1997: 167) that Mead left on this subject demonstrates the extent to which his 
later thinking was directed towards the problem of temporality and how it might be 
integrated into a comprehensive theory of sociality (see for instance Mead, 1932, 
1938).  The key insight for the purposes of our argument here is that experience is 
constituted through events that emerge in the present out of the continuity of social 
actions. As people find themselves located between the past and the future, they are 
obliged to construct new meanings, reconstruing their histories in order to understand 
the emergent present.  These new understandings are projected forward into the future 
to anticipate and shape the outcomes of present actions, while at the same time 
themselves being shaped by these anticipations.  Ultimately then, experience arises in 
the continuous interplay between past and future, which informs and gives meaning to 
social actions in the living present.   
 
Inquiry 
Both Peirce and Dewey located a certain sort of logic, which they called ‘inquiry’, at 
the heart of their respective versions of Pragmatism. Peirce described inquiry in terms 
of a model of doubt and belief, where doubt signals some form of disruption to 
thinking and action, while belief is the state of resolution that is gained once doubt has 
been clarified (Peirce, 1877). It is belief that guides us into habitual actions, while 
doubt raises uncertainties as to the appropriateness of specific actions. Dewey 
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elaborated the notion of inquiry as a response to a specific type of experience, that 
which arises as an inevitable consequence of the continuous, self-correcting process 
that he called “the experimental habit of mind” (Dewey, 1910: 55):  
 
“Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate 
situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and 
relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified 
whole” (Dewey, 1938 [1986]: 108) 
 
Dewey argued that inquiry in everyday life has the same structure as scientific 
inquiry. He saw it as a process that starts with a sense that something is wrong and 
that the normal course of activity cannot proceed uninterrupted. This invites a phase 
of deliberation that endeavours to understand what it is that is wrong, what is the 
nature of the obstacle to continuing action, what resistance needs to be overcome? 
Then there is a phase of analysis and diagnosis of the conditions that are creating the 
impediment to continuing action, followed by thought experiments in which possible 
solutions are abductively proposed (Dewey, 1933 [1986]). It is in this process that 
Mead’s subjective ‘I’ comes into play. This is the spontaneous, performative principle 
of action that introduces variation and novelty into experience. Without the ‘I’, the 
self’s habits of mind would be entirely determined and bound by collective norms of 
conduct. Thus inquiry involves the probing actions of the ‘I’, which are the source of 
creative potential in human actions (Joas, 1996). The final phase in the inquiry 
process is to implement the preferred working hypothesis, the results of which then 
inform another cycle of inquiry (Dewey, 1938).   
 
 18
Mead (1938: 3-25) articulated a very similar model of reflexive thinking that 
comprises four dynamically interdependent phases: an Impulse arrests ongoing action 
when a difference is perceived between the anticipated results of this action, and the 
results that actually occurred. In other words, there has been a failure to adequately 
anticipate the consequences of these actions. Then there is a phase of Perception, 
where this mismatch between anticipation and actuality is explored to reveal the 
conditions that need to be resolved. This is followed by a phase of Manipulation 
during which alternative hypotheses are formed and evaluated. Mead’s cycle then 
closes with a phase of Consummation, in which modified actions are enacted. These 
models of Dewey and Mead are complementary, both capturing the temporal 
interweaving of social agency, reflection and experience, and demonstrating the 
creative potential for new thinking in all social actions. They challenge teleological 
assumptions that outcomes of actions are, or can be, pre-determined; indeed, in a pre-
designed world there is no space for the expression of human creativity. Inquiry 
cannot be reduced to a response to purely abstract thoughts because it is anchored in 
everyday situations. It is part of life to inquire, mull things over, come to conclusions 
and make evaluations. We do it all the time whether we are aware of it or not. This is 
how we learn and become cognizant of our world and who we are in this world.  
 
Habit 
All four of the original Pragmatists were concerned with habit, especially as it relates 
to inquiry. Peirce (1878) saw habit as a type of action that is repeated in response to 
recurring situations. It is when these habitual actions are disrupted that inquiry may be 
invoked. James recognized the social significance of habit, describing it as “the 
enormous flywheel of society, its most precious conservative agent” (James, 1891 
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[1952]: 79). Dewey’s notion of habit can be traced to his critique of the reflex arc 
(Dewey, 1896 [1972]), where his term ‘organic coordination’ may be read as organic 
habitual conduct. Later, especially in his ‘Human Nature and Conduct’, Dewey 
unfolds his notion of habit as: 
 
“(…) that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity and 
in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or 
systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic 
in quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some 
subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity” 
(Dewey, 1922 [1988]: 31). 
 
Habit may be understood then, as “a readiness to act overtly in a specific fashion 
whenever opportunity is presented … [Thus,] the essence of habit is an acquired 
predisposition to ways or modes of response (…)” (Dewey, 1922 [1988]: 32). In other 
words, habits are acquired dispositions to respond in certain ways in certain 
circumstances; habits allow us to anticipate our own and other persons’ conduct in a 
given situation, as well as how a situation may unfold. In Mead’s terms, habits are the 
dispositions that come to be embodied in that aspect of the self he called the objective 
‘me’. As such, habits are expressions of social norms of conduct, but at the same time, 
they are dynamically emergent, admitting the possibilities of mutability and change 
over time. This position contrasts significantly with more conventional views of 
habits as rigid and fixed.  
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Mead’s ‘significant symbols’ are also relevant in the context of habits. He defined 
significant symbols as actions that call out the same response in the gesturer and the 
responder, they are “… nothing but the stimulus whose response is given in advance” 
(Mead, 1934: 181). Habits of behaviour make it easier for others to anticipate our 
actions in given situations, and as such, they contribute to the construction of 
sociality. It is sociality that provides the insight necessary to be able to anticipate 
someone else’s responses to our own actions, and thereby to regulate our own conduct 
in terms of likely outcomes. Significant symbols then, allow us to see our actions as 
others might, and to consciously shape the roles that we adopt in different social 
contexts. In Mead’s view, all human sociality is based on significant symbols and 
symbolic behaviours such as habits. 
 
Dewey further proposed that customs are habits expressed more or less uniformly 
within any social group in which members are engaged with the same environmental 
situations. The socialization of new members into a group requires these newcomers 
to incorporate the group’s customs and established modes of transaction into their 
own habits of action. It is these customs that guide us in terms of acceptable codes of 
social behaviour including ethical distinctions between virtue and vice, and aesthetic 
considerations in social activities. In effect, customs are symbolic forms of action by 
means of which we can communicate cultural expectations of conduct within social 
groups.  
 
Transaction 
The notion of the social self as a being that is continuously in the making, in effect a 
becoming, is central to Pragmatism. Both Dewey (1949 [1991]) and Mead (1934) 
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wrote extensively about the intersubjective processes of social engagement by means 
of which becoming emerges. This is well illustrated by Mead’s discussion of gestural 
conversations wherein one person’s gesture calls out a response in another person, 
which in turn calls out a further response, and so on in an ongoing cycle of 
communication. It is through these communicative processes that we become 
socialized to any given group of people, we form mutual expectations of conduct, and 
at the same time we come to understand both self and situation. The social meaning of 
any given gesture is reflected in the response that it engenders, and as the cycle of 
gesture and response proceeds the meanings that we construe are either reinforced, or 
challenged, or completely disrupted. In other words, our social interactions may be 
seen as both expressions of habitual conduct, and creative, improvisational processes 
of making new meanings. 
 
In his later writing, Dewey sought to make finer distinctions in this process by 
differentiating between interactions (actions between entities), and transactions 
(actions across entities) (Dewey & Bentley, 1949 [1991]: 112-115). Bernstein 
explained this distinction as follows: 
 
“Transaction is a refinement of interaction. In a transaction, the 
components themselves are subject to change. Their character affects and 
is affected by the transaction. Properly speaking, they are not independent: 
they are phases in a unified transaction. Thus transaction is a more 
rigorous formulation of the category of the organic which is embedded in 
Dewey’s earliest philosophic writings. Transaction is a generic trait of 
existence” (Bernstein, 1960: xl).  
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When the relation between self and situation is understood in terms of inter-action, 
this implies physically and mentally separated subjects who interact on the basis of 
specific regularities or principles by means of which they can influence each other. 
Alternatively, when selves and situations are related to each other on the basis of a 
trans-actional understanding, they may be seen as mutually constituting aspects of an 
integrated unity. 
 
Dewey’s purpose in making this distinction was to separate this Pragmatist notion 
from the more common usage of ‘interactionism’ in the literature. Returning to 
Mead’s work, it is now clear that when he used the term ‘interaction’ he was in fact 
referring to what Dewey later termed a ‘transaction’. The interactants in a gesture / 
response cycle both shape, and are shaped by, their interaction. Rather than 
constructing meanings between themselves, they actually are the emergent meanings. 
Mead further argued that in any system of inquiry, transactions are not limited to the 
inter-subjective domain. For instance, transactions between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ 
function intra-personally to construct the social self, and once significant symbols 
arise in a social situation, they facilitate and mediate an extra-personal level of 
transactional engagement and meaning-making. Thus the notion of transaction 
challenges the more conventional view of social systems operating at various, more or 
less discrete levels, by promoting instead an understanding of social practices as the 
continuously emergent weaving together of social selves and social situations. 
 
In the next section, we demonstrate how these four key themes in Pragmatism may be 
used in developing a transactional approach to organizational learning. Then, in the 
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following section, we explore more broadly how Pragmatism might enrich processual 
understandings of organizations, such as that offered by sensemaking theory. 
 
Pragmatism in organizational learning 
The literature on organizational learning has for many years contained an unfinished 
debate on whether organizations are able to learn, or whether individuals must learn 
before their knowledge is somehow transferred to the organization (Cook & Yanow, 
1993). In the early literature, organizational learning was defined as individuals’ 
acquisition of information and knowledge, and later as analytical and communicative 
skills (Argyris & Schön, 1996; March & Simon, 1958). Scholarly reaction to this 
understanding has been to take learning out of the purely cognitive domain of 
individuals’ minds, locating it instead in the processes of participation in 
organizational communities of practice (Elkjaer, 2003; Lave & Wenger, 1991). 
Whereas the former is focused upon mental representations, the latter is concerned 
with the maintenance of organizational practices, in which learning is associated with 
socialization and the institutionalization of knowledge (Gherardi, 2000). From this 
perspective, however, it is difficult to understand how organizational learning can be 
creative, innovative, and generative of new knowledge and action. An understanding 
of learning as participation in communities of practice tends, in other words, to 
overlook the conservativism, protectionism and the tendency to recycle knowledge in 
organizations, rather than critically challenging and extending it (Fenwick, 2001).  
 
A Pragmatist definition of learning (and organizational learning) encompasses all four 
of the themes outlined above (experience, inquiry, habit and transaction) to frame 
learning as a social practice that is both creative and habitual, and in which 
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knowledge is necessarily open-ended and fallible. Learning then, is the acquisition of 
more varied and complex predispositions to act, through which the world becomes 
more differentiated and “infused with meaning” (Biesta & Burbules, 2003: 37). In 
other words, Pragmatism has potential to offer new insights into some of the problems 
in the current literature on organizational learning by conceptualizing learning as: 
x Transactional, encompassing all levels of the learning system, rather than one 
(individual) and then another (organizational);  
x Derived from inquiry in which knowledge and action are continuous and co-
constituting rather than knowledge/participation followed by action/practice; 
x Not only about socialization (habit), but also creative practice, where the two are 
intertwined in real-time experience.  
 
To illustrate the benefits of Pragmatism in understanding organizational learning we 
now examine a classical piece within the international organizational learning 
literature, namely the works of Argyris and Schön, who themselves claim to have 
Pragmatist roots (Argyris & Schön, 1996; Elkjaer & Wahlgren, 2006). Their central 
concern with ‘actionable knowledge’ is very much in line with Pragmatism (Argyris, 
2003). In our view, however, they depart from Pragmatism by retaining a fundamental 
dualism between knowledge and action, which, in turn, generates an avalanche of 
further dualisms.  
 
For instance, Argyris and Schön see organizational learning as first and foremost a 
task of individuals because: 
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 “Organizational learning occurs when individuals within an organization 
experience a problematic situation and inquire into it on the organization’s 
behalf” (Argyris & Schön, 1996).  
 
When individuals make an inquiry, it can lead them to modify their understanding of 
the organization. If this individual learning is to turn into organizational learning, it 
must become part of how other individuals understand the organization in terms of 
organizational routines and stories.  
 
Argyris and Schön resolve the problem of transfer between individual and 
organizational levels by defining the organization as a political entity in which 
individuals act and learn on behalf of the organization. In our Pragmatist 
understanding, the relationship between individual and organization is not guided by 
individuals’ choices but by the transactional interplay between the two. The meanings 
attached to individuals and organizations are, therefore, highly interdependent and 
continuously evolving. This transactional approach draws together subjects 
(individuals), objects (knowledge) and situations into a mutually constituting, 
dynamic whole. To see organizational learning as fundamentally transactional is to 
focus on the interplay between selves and situations rather than treating them as 
discrete levels in the social system. If these levels are treated separately, then we are 
left with the intractable problem of having to glue them together again. We propose 
that learning does not begin with either individuals or organizations, but with 
uncertainties about the situations in which people find themselves. Responses to these 
uncertainties are guided by habit and the playful experimentation of social selves 
exploring new ways of defining and solving uncertain situations.   
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The second major dualism in the Argyris & Schön account of organizational learning 
is the separation of knowledge and action, whereas Pragmatism sees both as integral 
aspects of inquiry. Argyris and Schön do use the term inquiry but in a way that holds 
knowledge and action apart rather than integrating the two together. This 
interpretation of inquiry is underpinned by their understanding of predispositions to 
act (i.e. habits) as based upon individuals’ ‘theories of action’, which are mental 
models or representations of actions. In other words, they see selves as theories of 
action (knowledge) that then guide the actual actions taken.  
 
Argyris & Schön further differentiate between theories of action as ‘espoused’ or 
‘theories-in-use’, which are respectively those theories of action that can be expressed 
in words, and those that can only be inferred from observation of individuals’ actions. 
Theories-in-use may remain tacit because they are either indescribable (the 
individuals who enact them are unable, rather than unwilling to verbally describe the 
knowledge embedded in their everyday actions) or undiscussable (any attempt to 
reveal their incongruity with the espoused theory of the organization would be 
perceived as threatening or embarrassing and, as such, best kept in the quiet). Again, 
we think that this focus upon mental models fails to show how knowledge (‘the 
mental’) is always linked to action, and that knowledge encompasses action not as a 
representation but as a disposition towards certain ways to act. If knowledge is 
conceived in these representational terms, it becomes difficult to see where creativity 
comes from  (i.e. where is the experimental and instrumental playfulness with 
different solutions to defined problems?). This cognitivist approach implies that it is 
within humans rather than between humans (and materialities) that problems are 
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solved and new knowledge is generated. This is very different from the Pragmatist 
approach that situates learning and knowledge production in transactions between 
selves and situations rather than within selves and outside situations.  
 
In a Pragmatist take on organizational learning, the predispositions to act are habits, 
which are much more than mere mental models. The cultural and historical 
dimensions of habit suggest that organizational learning is a situated social practice 
rather than merely a social technology to be implemented. The notion of habit 
reminds us of the gradual transition between organizational routines and 
organizational change; it reminds us that organizational learning may be both 
reproductive, by producing more of the same or similar experience, and innovative, 
by producing novel experience. It is precisely in maintaining habit as disposition to 
act in open-ended and creative ways that experience and inquiry are linked in 
Pragmatism. 
 
Inquiry is ‘how we think’; it is the method through which learning takes place and 
reasoning is nurtured by guidance (e.g. teaching). Inquiry in a Pragmatist sense cuts 
across description and normative guidelines because it involves both emotion and 
judgment. It is initiated by an uneasy situation, an unsettled or disturbed situation 
(experienced as emotion) that requires resolution (involving judgment), and which in 
turn, produces learning. The notion of inquiry also alerts us to the open-endedness of 
experimental, creative and innovative reasoning.  
 
Now turning to the third issue that we highlighted above, the intertwining of 
socialization and creativity, Pragmatism alerts us to learning (and creation of 
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knowledge) as experimental and instrumental. In other words, it invites us to see ideas 
and concepts as tools to play with and to use in reasoning. This helps us see how 
expansion and transformation of organizational routines can happen through inquiry 
and anticipatory reasoning. To learn in a Pragmatist sense is to infuse uncertain 
situations with meaning, which involves firstly defining the situation as a problem. 
This means that learning is a process of constructing selves and situations, resulting in 
actionable knowledge. In Pragmatism, this creation of meaning can never be predicted 
by any a priori assignment of power, because it is always relative to a situation.  
 
Organizational learning through inquiry is, in other words, opening learning to the 
playfulness of how concepts and ideas are intertwined with actions not only in a 
reflective and backwards looking sense but also in a forward looking way. Routines 
and habits (i.e. predispositions to act in certain ways) will always prevail in 
organizations but Pragmatism stresses how experimental and instrumental ways of 
using ideas and concepts in a forward looking, abductive way helps us to see how 
creativity and innovation are also inherent in organizational learning. Understanding 
experience as the lived and living processes of selves engaging with the natural and 
social situations changes the focus from patterns of access and participation in the 
organizational communities of practice to ways in which participation unfolds 
(Gherardi et al., 1998). Possible questions to ask then are: Do these ways of 
participation allow for inquiry into interruptions and challenges of the status quo, is it 
possible to maintain an open-ended understanding of solutions to organizational 
problems, and how is it possible to create, recreate and even transform experience?  
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In sum, our Pragmatist version of organizational learning starts from an understanding 
of organizations as lived and living organisms, which consist of certain habits (i.e. 
habitual dispositions to act). These are learned through experience by inquiring 
transactionally into uncertain situations. The trigger for inquiry is a felt uncertainty or 
tension, which produces experience that sometimes can turn into knowledge 
(‘warranted assertabilities’) in the sense that it can be communicated through 
language (signs and symbols), and thus shared. Creativity lies in the abductive 
orientation towards the future, which is explored by the ‘I’ as it plays with and puts 
together new ways of engaging with social situations.  
 
Argyris & Schön’s view of organizational learning starts from the assumption that 
action is guided by theories-of-action, where this appears to be their interpretation of 
the Pragmatist notions of habit, and inquiry. They do not speak of transaction but 
‘interaction’ between individuals and organizations, and mental models appear to 
have replaced experience. To us this means that it is not possible to understand 
organizational learning across levels and across the knowledge-action divide, but 
most importantly it prevents us from understanding socialization and creativity as 
inherent in all transactions and not to be tied into systems of different loops of 
thinking. 
 
By contrast, a Pragmatist take on organizational learning alerts us to socialization and 
learning as relational practices; it alerts us to the connection between knowledge and 
action and to learning as transactional (involving both selves and situations). 
Pragmatism sees organizational learning as a temporal continuity, having a certain 
rhythm that is not only process or ‘flow’, but also rest and repose. The anticipatory 
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outlook on knowledge and action makes organizational learning creative and non-
intentional, and it allows us to transcend the problems associated with the traditional 
separation of levels of analysis.  When initiating organizational learning, we look for 
disjunctions, relocations and tensions because it is here that we find the seeds of 
creativity and innovation embedded in the organizational habitual knowledge and 
actions. This view of organizational learning encompasses emotion, ethics and 
aesthetics alongside ideas and concepts as mutually informing aspects of experience.  
 
Pragmatism, practice and sensemaking 
We now turn to consider what Pragmatism has to offer the wider field of organization 
theory. Philosophically speaking, there is a fundamental cleavage in the contemporary 
scholarship of this field that separates entitative and processual orientations towards 
scholarship and inquiry. This distinction is thoroughly articulated, for instance, by 
Tsoukas and Chia (2002), who contrasted two distinct ontologies: ‘Being’, which 
locates reality in substances, things and events, and ‘Becoming’, which approaches 
reality through flux, flow and continuity. The limitations of the entitative, or ‘being’, 
perspective in organization studies were recognized by Weick (1979: 44) when he 
exhorted us to “stamp out nouns”. He argued that the language we use shapes the 
ways in which we think about, and engage with, the organizational world. “If students 
of organization become stingy in their use of nouns, generous in their use of verbs, 
and extravagant in their use of gerunds, then more attention would be paid to process 
and we’d learn more about how to see it and manage it” (Weick, 1979: 44). In 
response to this call to action, there has been a veritable explosion of ‘-ing’ words in 
the organizational literature, such as organiz-ing, learn-ing, know-ing, do-ing, and 
strategiz-ing. But because gerunds can function as both nouns and verbs, this semantic 
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device has not produced as radical a shift in thinking as perhaps Weick might have 
hoped. Indeed, this same literature continues to be relatively uncritically peppered 
with dualistic distinctions between, for instance, individual and collective levels of 
analysis, or contrasting states of stability and change, revealing the resilience of 
entitative thinking in organization studies. 
 
The adoption of a processual, ‘becoming’ ontology really does require a radical 
rearrangement of the ways in which we talk about the dynamics of our social world, 
but in shifting to this alternative position, much of what an entitative view can offer is 
lost. A more complex approach to organization would require us to transcend this 
dualistic separation between entitative and processual ontologies. Challenging such 
dualisms was very much part of the Pragmatist agenda. Dewey in particular railed 
against the artificial separation of body and mind, and knowledge and action, arguing 
that these dualisms cut across dynamic processes, disrupting their continuity. Both 
Mead (1932) and Whitehead (see Bakken & Hernes, 2006) argued that a more 
comprehensive view of society (and therefore organization) must draw upon both 
verbs and nouns, but without privileging either. This implies a different philosophical 
paradigm in which the interplay between verbs and nouns produces an ontology of 
practice (Simpson, 2009) that is located in the lived experience of organization and 
the ways in which meanings interact with people’s conduct. Working in an alternative 
paradigm like this implies not only a shift in ontology, but also in other philosophical 
dimensions such as epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. We propose that 
Pragmatism offers just such a well elaborated system of philosophy that allows us to 
understand organization as an ever-changing movement of meanings and actions 
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punctuated by events that signify the socially constructed understandings arising out 
of the otherwise undifferentiated flux of experience.  
 
To illustrate this potential, we now focus specifically on the organizational theorizing 
of Karl Weick, who is widely regarded as one of the most influential thinkers in 
contemporary organization studies (Sutcliffe et al., 2006). He is best known for his 
theories of organizing and sensemaking, and is much cited for his provocative, and 
often counter-intuitive turns of phrase that oblige us to pause, to inquire, and to make 
new sense from his words. Throughout his very considerable oeuvre, the influence of 
William James is abundantly evident. Weick’s work is threaded through with James’ 
imagery of the world as “a buzzing, pulsating, formless mass of signals, out of which 
people try to make sense, into which they attempt to introduce order, and from which 
they construct against a background that remains undifferentiated” (Czarniawska, 
1998: 1). Equally, Weick regularly cites Mead, albeit as seen through the eyes of the 
symbolic interactionists and the Chicago School more generally (e.g.Blumer, 1969; 
Goffman, 1969; Strauss, 1956). However, he only rarely cites Dewey, and even less 
frequently, Peirce. It would seem likely then, there may be more that Pragmatism 
could offer to Weick’s already fertile theorizing.  In particular we consider there are at 
least three areas for potential development:  
 
x Continuity as the interplay of past and future in the present; 
x The transactional nature of social agency; and 
x Reflexivity as an explicit element in the theorizing of social practices. 
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In many ways, Pragmatism and Weick’s theories are very synergistic, but he deviated 
from Pragmatism in his basic recipe for sensemaking, which he expressed in his 
signature question “How can I know what I think until I see what I say?” (Weick, 
1979: 133). That is, we come to know the meaning of our actions only after the event. 
Meaning is, therefore, constructed retrospectively, or as Weick said “[m]uch 
organizational sensemaking consists of writing histories” (1979: 200).  Equally, 
however, “[t]he person is able to understand an event only after imputing both a 
history and prospects to the puzzling enacted display” (Weick, 1979: 200). In this, 
Weick hints at the importance of future prospects as part of sensemaking, but 
although he does discuss “future perfect thinking” (Weick, 1979: 197-200), this future 
orientation remains under-theorized and is not integrated into his theories of 
organizing and sensemaking (see for example Gioia & Mehra, 1996; Patriotta, 2003). 
 
By contrast, the Pragmatist maxim with which we opened this chapter (Peirce, 1878) 
points directly to anticipated future consequences of actions as the source of meaning 
in the present moment. These future anticipations may be understood in terms of 
Peirce’s notion of abduction (Anderson, 1987), in which hypothetical actions are 
projected forward into the future. Past histories are used as resources in constructing 
these hypotheses, but it is their imagined consequences that inform the actual actions 
taken in the present moment. Sensemaking then, may be seen more fully as a 
continuous process of reconstruing meanings that are drawn simultaneously from the 
past and the future. It is this interplay between past and future that gives temporal 
continuity to actions in the living present (Mead, 1932). The abductive possibility of 
anticipating different and alternative futures eases the bonds of our histories and 
opens up novel opportunities for further action. Without this future orientation, 
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sensemaking is necessarily constrained to a convergent, retrospective process that 
perpetually reproduces history. Pragmatists would argue that this denies the inherent 
creativity of life and living, and without this, our understandings of people’s conduct 
in organizations will be impoverished. 
 
The second area where we think Pragmatism might usefully enhance Weick’s 
theorizing is by embracing more fully the implications of a transactional, rather than 
merely interactional, view of social engagement (Dewey & Bentley, 1949 [1991]). 
Weick (1979: Chapter 4) initially defined interacts and double interacts in terms that 
are consistent with Mead’s (1934) notion of the ‘conversation of gestures’. However, 
he went on to argue that double interacts are constituted as ‘stable subassemblies’ of 
interlocked behaviours involving two or more individuals, where these subassemblies 
are the building blocks of organizational structures. This formulation tends to reduce 
interlocking behaviours to a somewhat mechanistic interpersonal exchange that 
focuses rather too narrowly on the cognitive and representational aspects of 
organizing and sensemaking, while denying the creative potential of our social 
engagements.  
 
By contrast, the Pragmatist approach seeks to transcend the entitative distinctions that 
set cognition and structure apart from bodily sensation and agency respectively. It 
emphasizes the social nature of agency whereby the meanings of both selves and 
situations are co-constructing and immanent within each other. By focusing on actions 
rather than actors, the transactional perspective offers a more holistic view that is not 
restricted to any specific level of analysis. Indeed, this capacity to transcend levels of 
analysis is a defining quality of the Pragmatist notion of transaction, which is also 
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inclusive of emotional and aesthetic actions as well as the influencing dynamics of 
power in social situations. We suggest that many current topics in organization 
studies, such as identity work, emotion work, idea work, and strategy work, might 
usefully be elaborated in these transactional terms. 
 
Finally we turn to consider reflexivity in organizing and sensemaking. Weick (2006: 
1731) recently declared “Order, interruption, recovery. That is sensemaking in a 
nutshell.” While this summary statement highlights the key events of sensemaking, it 
leaves unspoken the human experience of this process. By comparison, Dewey’s more 
elaborated process of inquiry (1933 [1986]) locates critical reflexivity and human 
transactions at its centre as it proceeds from habitual action, through a disturbance or 
interruption, then on to an analysis of the causes of the disruption, the abductive 
generation of options for further action, and finally the selection and testing of a 
preferred course of action to overcome the immediate causes of the interruption. 
Reflexivity arises in transactions because it is here that sociality is constructed as we 
attempt to see the world through the eyes of others. Mead (1925) argued that 
transactions are the site where the self can appear to itself as an object of reflection 
and inquiry. Self awareness is not generated in circumstances where habitual actions 
continue uninterrupted; rather it is when unanticipated eventualities demand new 
meanings that a reflexive response is called out. Every gesture made during this 
transactional process is made in anticipation of some specific response or outcome, 
and every response invites reflection on the extent to which the anticipated outcome 
was realized.  
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This incremental, experimental process of constructing new meanings out of 
unexpected events is thus dependent upon the human capacity to reflect not only on 
past events, but also on the repertoire of alternative futures that can be creatively 
imagined. So for instance, the indigenous Maori people of New Zealand talk about 
‘walking backwards into the future’, which means that as their lives unfold forwards, 
they are ever conscious of the function of history not only in shaping their present 
actions, but also in guiding them into the future. This relentless dynamic of 
anticipation and action is what provides continuity in practice, and it is reflexivity that 
admits this temporal experiencing of time and the possibilities of change as emergent 
and evolutionary. In this way then, Pragmatism demystifies reflexivity, making it a 
normal and natural part of all social practices. 
 
The three themes that have focused our discussion here were prompted by our reading 
of Weick’s theories of organizing and sensemaking. We do not intend to suggest that 
our analysis of these theories is exhaustive; it is merely illustrative of the potential for 
Pragmatism to bring new and subtly nuanced insights into the domain of organization 
studies. Nor do we intend to suggest that Weick’s ideas are the only ones that might 
benefit from some Pragmatist insight. We propose that Pragmatism has considerable 
potential to contribute to better understandings of the social dynamics of 
organizational practices more generally. In this, we frame Pragmatist thinking as a 
complete system of philosophy that transcends the common distinctions between 
entitative and processual ontologies by focusing on practice as the intricate 
interweaving of social agency and temporality. In this way, the meanings of events 
and objects in the present moment are inseparable from the continuity of experience, 
where this experience arises in social transactions. 
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Conclusion  
Organization theory today is increasingly faced with seemingly intractable problems 
as scholars struggle to find adequate ways of engaging with the multi-site, multi-
cultural complexities of globalized business, and the at best, only partially predictable 
social dynamics of organizational practices. In this chapter, we have proposed 
Pragmatism as a way forward that offers a potentially radical alternative to the 
currently dominant paradigms of organizational scholarship. Entitative and processual 
philosophies each provide valuable insights into the nature of organization, but 
equally, each has its own limitations. The Pragmatist alternative seeks to transcend 
this entitative / processual dualism by understanding organizational practice as the 
continuous and emergent weaving together of social selves and social situations. Its 
focus is very much upon the social nature of real-time actions that constitute living 
and lived experience. This perspective, then, offers a way of approaching ‘how’ and 
‘why’questions that remain difficult to address by more conventional means. 
 
The distinctiveness of Pragmatism can be traced back to the originating maxim first 
articulated by Charles Sanders Peirce in 1878. In this, he suggested that the meanings 
we ascribe to events and actions in the present moment can be understood entirely in 
terms of the future consequences that we anticipate arising from these events and 
actions. This future orientation sets Pragmatism apart from philosophies that account 
for meanings solely in terms of retrospective interpretations of past experiences. 
Pragmatism recognizes retrospection to the extent that it informs what we imagine 
will happen next, but it is this future anticipation that actually gives meaning to our 
actions in the present. In this way, Pragmatism acknowledges the constitution of both 
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agency and structure in social practices, but without privileging either. At the same 
time, it theorizes the temporal continuity of present moments as both anchored in the 
past and thrusting into the future. This approach to temporality as a continuously 
emergent social process of meaning-making invites new ways of engaging with the 
dynamics of organization. 
 
In addition to these broad defining themes, we have identified four theoretical 
concepts that are potentially very useful to organizational scholars. These four 
concepts, ‘experience’, ‘inquiry’, ‘habit’ and ‘transaction’, are mutually informing 
and interdependent aspects of all social practices. Unlike the everyday notion of 
experience as the knowledge gained from doings, the Pragmatist use of this term 
relates very specifically to the dynamic relationship between knowledge (or meaning) 
and action in the conduct of the living present. Inquiry is the social process of 
critically reflecting upon and questioning the taken-for-granted order, which is every 
bit as relevant in day-to-day conduct as it is in more specialized forms of knowledge 
production, such as scientific work. Habit is seen as the predisposition to act in certain 
ways; inquiry is stimulated when these habitual ways of acting prove inadequate for 
any given situation. Habits are what makes it possible to live within society, but 
importantly, the Pragmatists did not see habits as rigidly fixed. Indeed, it is the 
mutability of habits that admits the possibilities of creative change in social practices. 
And finally, transactions are the site where the interplay between experience, inquiry 
and habit is continuously explored and regenerated across all levels of the social 
system.  
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We have demonstrated the use of these four Pragmatists concepts in the context of 
organizational learning, suggesting that this field is an obvious target for some fresh 
theoretical thinking. In particular, we chose to take a closer look at the work of 
Argyris & Schön because they claimed Pragmatism as the point of departure for their 
theory of organizational learning. We suggest, however, that they have not fully 
embraced the potential of Pragmatism as their work continues to reflect dualistic 
distinctions between knowledge and action, and individuals and organization. These 
constraints limit the extent to which their theory can accommodate the creative as 
well as the socializing aspects of learning. We then extended our argument to show 
that Pragmatism offers tools that are much needed in contemporary organization 
theory. Using Weick’s theories of organizing and sensemaking to illustrate our 
argument, we proposed that the Pragmatist formulations of continuity, transactional 
engagement, and reflexivity offer useful ways of further developing organizational 
scholarship.   
 
Ultimately though, organization and management studies is an intensely practical 
domain where practical problems demand practical solutions. To paraphrase Kurt 
Lewin, we suggest that there’s nothing so practical as a good philosophy that provides 
the intellectual tools to challenge assumptions and to understand issues in new and 
deeper ways. From its inception, Pragmatism has always been a very practical 
philosophy, although we acknowledge that its diversity of ideas has created 
difficulties for scholars who might wish to come to grips with it. Nevertheless, a slow 
trickle of papers informed by Pragmatist thinking is beginning to emerge in the 
organizational literature (e.g. Cohen, 2007; Locke et al., 2008; C. W. Weick, 2008), 
which we see as a positive sign for future developments. What is needed now is 
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concerted effort to develop methodologies that are true to the principles of 
Pragmatism, and which can better inform empirical inquiries into the practical 
problems of organization as a dynamic and emergent process of meaning-making. The 
experimental, instrumental and anticipatory aspects of Pragmatism as a lived and 
living philosophy offer a rich vein of inspirational themes, which in our view, will 
reward further exploration and elaboration in the field of organization and 
management studies   
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